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Natural History and Narrative Sympathy: the Children’s Animal Stories of Edward 
Augustus Kendall (1775/6?—1842) 
 
In the course of his adventures, Keeper, the canine protagonist of a once-famous 
novel by children’s writer Edward Augustus Kendall, meets an angry herd of oxen.1 
With short, dramatic sentences focusing on Keeper’s perceptions and fears, the 
narrative encourages readers to imagine themselves in his place: “They rushed 
furiously toward him. They lowered their heads as if in the act of butting. Keeper was 
now surrounded. Death seemed inevitable” (82). The dog manages to slip under one 
of the animals, and flees over a frozen pool, only to sink into breaking ice; by the time 
he struggles free, more cattle are waiting for him on the other side. After a few tense 
moments, he escapes to the next field through a gap in the hedge. Keeper now 
“fancie[s] himself safe”, but further dangers are evidently round the corner (85). 
In this scene, Kendall shows himself adept at the creation of what I am calling 
narrative sympathy: that is, a mode of fictional writing, increasingly common in the 
late eighteenth century, that encouraged readers to project themselves in imagination 
into another’s situation, without losing sight of the distinction between self and other. 
Experimentation by novelists, from Fielding’s indirect access to and sceptical analysis 
of “the secret Springs, various Windings, and perplexed Mazes” of human life,2 to 
Richardson’s use of the epistolary form to convey a sense of direct access to his 
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character’s sensations, had opened up new avenues for exploring human mind in 
fiction. Novelists such as Burney, Radcliffe and Charlotte Smith were further 
developing the use of free indirect discourse and thought report to represent the mind 
at work, pointing the way to Austen’s superb achievements early in the following 
century. 
What immediately distinguishes Kendall from these writers is that the fictional 
experiences he asks his readers to engage in belong to the world of non-human 
animals. Keeper’s Travels (1798), his most popular work, established the dog story as 
a central element of children’s fiction,3 while he treated small birds in a succession of 
short fictions: The Sparrow (1798), The Crested Wren, The Canary Bird (both 1799), 
and The Swallow (1800).
4
  Kendall was not the first or only writer of the time to treat 
the experiences of fictional animals. Many of the period’s large number of children’s 
stories featured animal protagonists or contained significant discussion of animals, 
reflecting their roots in Aesopian tradition, a Lockean educational agenda that 
emphasized kindness to animals as the basis for learning benevolence to humanity, 
and the rapid dissemination of natural history in the age of Linnaeus and Buffon.
5
 
Dorothy Kilner pioneered the animal autobiography for children in Life and 
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Perambulations of a Mouse (1783).
6
 Thomas Day, Mary Wollstonecraft, John Aikin 
and Anna Letitia Barbauld wrote children’s fiction in which animals featured. Perhaps 
the best known of children’s animal stories was Sarah Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories 
(1786), also known as the History of the Robins, which was widely read in the 
nineteenth century.
7
 While all these writers argued for kindness to animals, and Kilner 
in particular paid attention to the sympathetic rendering of her animal protagonist’s 
sensations, Kendall’s work is distinguished by his unusually sustained and 
philosophical attention to the problems of writing a non-human animal’s experience. 
In this essay I argue that Kendall pioneered a distinctive kind of animal 
fiction, in which sympathetic engagement with a non-human animal character is not 
reducible to simple anthropomorphism. As we will see, he combined his narrative 
sympathy with a close attention to descriptions of animal behaviour and animal 
cognition in recent works of natural history, inviting his readers to understand his 
animal characters as representatives of particular species, as well as feeling, 
experiencing individuals. Tension between these two aspects of his animals is 
sometimes evident, but it would over-simplify to present it as a difference between 
emotionally engaged narrative writing and the detached attitude of scientific natural 
history. Rather, tensions between similarity and difference, engagement and 
detachment, are internal to the narrative strategies he adopts, the philosophy on which 
these strategies are based, and the natural history on which he draws. 
To take the narrative strategies first: Kendall, as noted above, wrote at a time 
when novelists were experimenting with ways of representing mental states and 
actions. At their best they could move flexibly between creating the illusion of sharing 
                                                 
6
 Dorothy Kilner, The Life and Perambulation of a Mouse. 2 vols ([1783]; London, John Marshall, 
1790). 
7
 Sarah Trimmer, Fabulous Histories. Designed for the instruction of children, respecting their use of 
animals (London: T. Longman, and G.G.J. and J. Robinson; and J. Johnson, 1786). 
4 
 
a fictional character’s sensations, and inviting the reader to maintain sufficient 
detachment to reflect on, perhaps laugh at or criticise, that same character’s mental 
operations. They took part in the creation of readerly empathy described by critics 
such as Suzanne Keen and Alan Palmer. Palmer claims that “narrative fiction is, in 
essence, the presentation of fictional mental functioning”, the creation of characters’ 
mental worlds, into which readers have access through their exercise of empathy, “the 
power of entering into another’s personality and imaginatively experiencing their 
experiences … an essential part of the reading process.” 8 The modern term empathy 
now occupies some of the semantic ground claimed in the eighteenth century by 
sympathy;
9
 in this essay, I use the term narrative sympathy in preference to empathy 
to highlight the novel’s use of concepts of sympathy derived from Adam Smith, and 
to suggest a tension within narrative, mirroring that in Smith’s account, between 
identification with and separation from the object of sympathy. 
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith considers sympathy as 
the imaginative process by which we place ourselves in another’s situation. Using the 
example of our sensations when we see “our brother” tortured “upon the rack”, he 
writes that we cannot feel his pain through our own senses, but through an 
imaginative act:  “by our imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and 
become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his 
sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether 
unlike them.”10 A radical identification with the other is qualified by the phrases “as it 
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were” and “in some measure”, lending support to the view that for Smith, 
“sympathetic imagination does not dissolve the sense of separateness of either 
party”.11 At times, Smith seems to envisage sympathy as a projection of our own 
feelings rather than an appreciation of another’s. Imagination makes us feel on others’ 
behalf grief for a situation they cannot themselves appreciate, for example if they 
have lost their reason (15), or if they are dead (16). Our sympathy with the dead arises 
“from our lodging … our own living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence 
conceiving what would be our emotions in this case” (16). At other points, in order to 
counter the charge that sympathy is a selfish principle, he insists on maintaining the 
distinction between the feelings of the one who sympathizes and those of the object of 
sympathy. When condoling with a parent who has lost a son, he is not merely 
(selfishly) considering how he himself would feel in that circumstance: “I consider 
what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with 
you, but I change persons and characters.  My grief … is entirely upon your account” 
(374). Paradoxically, the very continuance of the distinction between the two parties 
here depends on imagination’s power almost to overcome difference by allowing the 
sympathizer to “change persons and characters” with his object. This notion of 
imaginative identification with another who remains separate enables Smith to 
account for a man’s sympathy with a woman’s pains in childbirth, “though it is 
impossible that he should conceive himself as suffering her pains in his own proper 
person and character” (374). 
 Smith’s notion of the imagination as letting us enter “as it were” into 
another’s character forms a philosophical basis for contemporary novelists’ 
experiments in readerly affect. Since imaginative acts, not necessarily the sight of real 
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others, are concerned, sympathy can easily extend to fictional characters. In 1785 the 
novelist and critic Clara Reeve applied Smithian concepts to the reading process when 
she defined the novel as a relation of events “such as may happen to our friend, or to 
ourselves,” in so realistic a way that “we are affected by the joys or distresses of the 
persons in the story, as if they were our own.”12 What does Smithian imaginative 
sympathy mean, though, for Kendall’s project of encouraging the child reader to be 
affected by the joys and distresses of dogs and birds? Smith himself, unlike his older 
contemporary Hume, does not discuss cross-species sympathy or sympathy in non-
human animals. Whereas Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739) treats sympathy 
as an automatic transference of feeling from one body to another, exemplified in a 
dog’s “howlings and lamentations” transferred to its fellows, and explicitly states that 
human sympathies can extend beyond our own species,
13
 Smith, by concentrating on 
sympathy as a complex mental operation involving the postulation of hypothetical 
states, implies that it is an exclusively human activity. We might infer that the 
sympathy that can extend to imaginary characters might also extend to non-humans 
(at least fictional ones), but perhaps such a feeling would be, like sympathy with the 
dead in Smith’s account, a case only of self-projection, “conceiving what would be 
our emotions.” Such a conclusion is encouraged by considering Kendall’s animal 
stories as part of the subgenre of “it-narratives” or “circulation novels”, which related 
the adventures of bank-notes and guineas as well as dogs, cats and flies. Reviewers 
then, as well as scholars now, identified these narratives as a recognisable group in 
which animal and inanimate protagonists equally belonged, as non-human objects 
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given a fictional human character for the purposes of entertainment or satire. 
14
 In an 
important discussion of eighteenth-century literary negotiations of sympathy for 
animals and slaves, Markman Ellis concludes that animal narrators, just like 
inanimate ones, function as substitute humans. It-narratives “no more try to think and 
feel like a dog or a pony than they do a wooden toy or a pincushion. … such narrators 
think and feel like humans.” While contending that dogs think, feel, and may have 
self-awareness, he nevertheless denies that imaginative narrative can approach any 
understanding of their minds: “the project of writing as a dog is absurd, a 
contradiction in terms, a fictional construction, as the supposed act of translation 
between dog-think and human language is not possible, no more possible than it 
would be to understand how a piece of wood thinks. That this is an uncrossable abyss 
is clear.”15  
However, I suggest that Kendall’s animal stories make a deliberate attempt to 
bridge what, according to one influential strand of eighteenth-century thought, was by 
no means an impassable gulf. In opposition to the view taken by some of Descartes’ 
followers, that animals functioned as machines with neither reason nor feeling, a 
number of thinkers considered them to possess both capacities, if in simpler form than 
those of human beings. In his Treatise, David Hume argued from analogy that we 
must assume from the similarities of action between ourselves and other animals that 
their mental operations resemble ours.
16
 He emphasized that animals have passions 
                                                 
14
 For eighteenth-century authors’ awareness of the it-narrative as a distinct kind, and a contemporary 
reviewer’s placing of the adventures of animal and inanimate characters in the same category, see Mark 
Blackwell, “Hackwork: It-narratives and Iteration”, in Mark Blackwell, ed., The Secret Life of Things: 
Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England. Lewisburg: Bucknell University 
Press, 2007, 187—217: 188, 210. For animal adventures as a significant part of the subgenre see Liz 
Bellamy, “It-Narrators and Circulation: Defining a Subgenre”, in Blackwell, 117—145: 119.  
15
 Markman Ellis, “Suffering Things: Lapdogs, Slaves, and Counter-Sensibility”, in Blackwell, 92—
113: 105. 
16
 “We are conscious, that we ourselves … are guided by reason and design, and that ‘tis not ignorantly 
nor casually we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and 
avoiding pain. When therefore we see other creatures … perform like actions, and direct them to like 
8 
 
like our own (2.1.12, 324—8; 2.2.12, 397—8). David Hartley concurred, and added 
that these similarities ought to prompt us to treat animals kindly.
17
 Writers such as 
Humphrey Primatt in a 1776 treatise, and Thomas Young in a 1798 pamphlet praised 
in Keeper’s Travels (iv), argued against cruelty to animals on the grounds of their 
susceptibility to pleasure and pain.
18
 Several poets, notably James Thomson and 
William Cowper, invoked animals’ feelings in order to arouse human sympathy for 
them.
19
 Kendall drew on several aspects of this multi-faceted tradition. In the 
introduction to The Sparrow, he explains in his narrative theory, based on the 
comparison of feeling across species:  
 
In order that the child may understand the feelings of the creature, we propose 
that they should be compared with his own. With this intention we have, in the 
following pages, introduced a bird which, while we have attended to its nature 
and habits, we have, nevertheless, represented in such a manner that the child 
may consider him as a companion. We have sought to bring about an 
intimacy… We have endeavoured, also, to set the sensations of the sparrow 
before the reader in such a way that he may acknowledge their relationship 
with his own: and to describe the events so that the child may interest himself 
in them as if they had befallen himself. We believe that whenever the reader 
enters thus into the fable, it will secure for itself a more certain and lasting 
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influence than mere maxims can at any time obtain. An acquaintanceship is 
commenced: the relative situation of the parties is altered… 
To cultivate those sympathies upon which benevolence is grafted, by 
shewing, ex exempla, how nearly all other animals resemble ourselves in their 
wants, pleasures, and natural faculties, the following pages were written (x—
xi). 
 
Here the basis of Kendall’s narrative technique in Smithian sympathy is clear. The 
bird is to become, in imagination, a “companion” related to the child and treated with 
“intimacy”, and the child is intended to respond to the story’s events “as if they had 
befallen himself”.  Yet the bird is not only an imaginary individual friend, but the 
representative of a species whose “nature and habits” differ from those of humans, 
and are the object of a lesson in natural history. The difference that co-exists with 
similarity is further discussed in Kendall’s introduction to The Swallow. Here, he 
admits that his fiction involves the falsity of fable and the attribution of non-existent 
powers to birds, but hopes nevertheless to convey that truer, more naturalist 
understanding of animal life that he believes must lead to greater sympathy for them:  
 
the author frequently attributes faculties to his animals which would be useless 
in their sphere, and which suppose cultivation; here, assuredly, physical 
veracity is violated … it is chiefly, however, by bringing animals forward in 
their real character, (a character possessed of certain portions of perception 
and memory, and the capacity of comparing ideas and acting in consequence) 
by becoming a voice to the dumb, that the author hopes to promote their 
benefit (xiii—xiv).  
10 
 
 
In various ways, Kendall’s stories attempt to convey what he calls the “real character” 
of animals. In The Crested Wren the bird protagonist, in fable fashion, has the power 
of speech, but uses it to explain differences between human and avian reasoning. With 
little idea of the future, the young birds have no worries when their family splits up: 
“We parted without design, and without troubling ourselves by the idea of eternal, or 
even long, separation” (30). In Keeper’s Travels, the dog has no verbal language, but 
can express sorrowful feelings shared by human and non-human alike: “those 
mournful plainings that want no words to render them intelligible: that universal 
language which is every where understood, by the inhabitant of every region, and by 
all orders of beings” (6—7). 
Jonathan Lamb has argued that the discourse of sympathy incorporated 
different degrees of attempt to identify with a radical, non-human, other; and that 
where fictional characters, from Swift’s Gulliver in the eighteenth century to 
Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello in the twentieth, identify with the non-human, they 
indeed court absurdity, or the breakdown of language, as they approach “the 
obliteration of all differences in a species of sympathy that proclaims the identity of 
the subject and the object.”20 Such obliteration of difference is not Kendall’s project. 
His attempts to convey an insight into how a non-human animal might feel 
correspond rather to what Lamb terms the third stage of a four-stage progression 
towards sympathetic identification, a stage he associates with Adam Smith’s notion of 
the imagination as providing a bridge between different subjectivities.
21
 We might 
think of Kendall as encouraging sympathy with his fictional animals by analogy, not 
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with Smithian sympathy for the dead, where we impose what would be our own 
feelings on those who can no longer feel, but with Smith’s account of a man’s 
sympathy for a woman’s childbirth pains. This cross-gender sympathy depends on a 
simultaneous sense of similarity (humans of both sexes have similar bodies and feel 
similar pains) and difference (a man cannot feel precisely those particular pains). 
Kendall extends the consideration of similarity and difference, applied by Smith to 
sympathy within the human species, outwards to encompass sympathies with other 
species. His stories attempt to find a fictional idiom for his understanding of non-
human animal life: that in feeling and experience it is more similar to human 
existence than was usually acknowledged, and that the differences in perception and 
expression characteristic of particular species can be understood through a process of 
sympathetic engagement. 
This attempt makes for a difference between Kendall’s fiction and the typical 
it-narrative, which confers fictional personhood on its inanimate or non-human animal 
protagonists by the use of established narrative conventions for the presentation of 
human characters. Kendall tends to avoid or play down the most obviously and 
artificially humanizing of these conventions, such as introducing the protagonist 
through relating his or her genealogy. Keeper, unlike other fictional dogs such as 
Pompey the Little, or Bob, the Dog of Knowledge,
22
 is given no ancestors, and the 
narrative plunges instead immediately into his experiences when, one market-day, he 
loses his master: “His misery increased every moment. …he stood, now, forlorn, 
stripped, helpless, and unprotected. …he frequently fancied that he saw the object of 
his search … he spent the greater part of the day in fruitless sallies” (3). It is true that 
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in this attempt to convey the dog’s feelings Kendall is dealing, in Ellis’s words, with 
“fictional constructions;”  but human minds in fiction are also constructions. Applying 
similar fictional techniques to the creation of human and non-human minds can have 
various results. It can be used, as Ellis suggests, to draw attention to the discrepancy 
between a narrator’s ostensibly non-human viewpoint and its inevitably human 
characteristics;
23
 or it may create an impression of similarity between the perspective 
and feelings of the human and the non-human animal. Kendall’s fiction deploys 
fictional animal minds in both ways at different times, moving between the poles of 
similarity and difference in order to encourage awareness of and sympathy with the 
distinctive attributes of different species of animal. 
 His insight into non-human animals came from his knowledge of eighteenth-
century natural history, including the works of Buffon, Thomas Pennant, William 
Smellie, and Bernadin de Saint Pierre, in whose work Kendall was particularly 
interested and whom he translated. Natural history feeds into most children’s stories 
at this time, and Kendall presented himself as heir to Sarah Trimmer, Anna Letitia 
Barbauld, Thomas Percival, John Aikin, and Maria Edgeworth, who had replaced the 
stunting, withering educational books of an earlier age with truth, philosophy and 
“familiarity with the foundations and discoveries of science”.24 His own stories are 
distinguished by the extent to which they replace the fabulists’ concern for the lessons 
for human behaviour to be derived from a metaphorical reading of animal lives with 
the teaching of natural history for its own sake and for the sake of its direct moral 
benefits. His concern for what he calls animals’ “real character” as opposed to the 
fictional identities they are given in fable comes from his reading in Buffon’s 
accounts of the morphology, characteristics and life-cycles of different species. 
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Turning away from old fables of bird life such as the story of the wren flying at the 
eagle, characterized by his goldcrest narrator as the kind of unreliable tale peddled by 
magpies (The Crested Wren, 6), Kendall underpinned his narratives with the more 
accurate accounts of recent naturalists. The first chapter of The Crested Wren closely 
follows Buffon’s account of a variety of wren species. 25 The crested wren of 
Kendall’s title is Buffon’s “Gold-Crested Wren”, today commonly called a goldcrest 
(regulus regulus) and seen as closer to the warbler and tit families than to the wrens.
26
 
Thomas Pennant is cited on the migration of goldcrests from the Orkneys, and on the 
taxonomy of hyenas. 
27
 The narrative of The Swallow turns on the migration of 
swallows and martins, still a subject of controversy among eighteenth-century 
naturalists, who argued over whether the birds flew to other countries or hibernated in 
caves or at the bottom of lakes. Kendall, through the character of the moralizing 
naturalist Mr Aylesford, comes down, like Buffon, on the side of migration to other 
countries (87—92), though he hedges his bets by having one young swallow survive 
the English winter in a “torpid sleep” under a roof (47—8).28  
Natural history informed Kendall’s presentation of the much-debated issue of 
animal intelligence. Buffon is generally unwilling to ascribe reasoning powers such as 
the comparison of ideas to animals, and emphasises humanity’s superior powers.29 
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However, in the Natural History of Birds, it is reported that house sparrows 
“judiciously” alter their nesting habits according to situation, adding a roof  when 
nesting in trees, but not when under cover. “Instinct discovers here a sort of 
reasoning, and at least implies a comparison of two small ideas” (3.438—9). Kendall 
repeats the story in The Swallow with a direct reference to Buffon (17). His own 
views are evidently influenced by those of William Smellie, whose Philosophy of 
Natural History opposes mechanistic accounts of animal behaviour, contending in 
Humean fashion that the operations of animal instinct add up to a mental activity 
differing only in degree, not in kind, from human reason.
30
 Kendall cites Smellie on 
the similarity of animal and human minds in The Swallow. Commenting on the 
sparrows’ clever nesting behaviour, he quotes directly from Smellie, providing a 
footnote to his source: 
 
Instances of the variableness of the habits of animals, of their docility and 
sagacity, have always been considered as wonderful; but this wonder is partly 
the effect of inattention; for, though man is unquestionably the chief of the 
animal creation, the other animals, according to the mental powers with which 
nature has endowed them, comparatively approach to or recede from the 
sagacity and genius of the human species. The whole is a graduated scale of 
intelligence.* A philosopher should, therefore, contemplate and admire the 
whole; but should never be surprised at any partial exhibitions of the general 
scene of intellect and animation.  
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*See Smellie’s Philosophy of Natural History’ (20—1). 31  
 
Kendall presents natural history knowledge as the harmonious partner, indeed 
the source, of cross-species sympathy. His aim, he explains in the Advertisement to 
The Swallow, is “to cultivate the knowledge, and consequent love, of Nature” (sig. 
A1r). His bird stories draw on naturalists’ work for their central picture of parental 
affections. Buffon remarks on swallows as having particularly strong parental 
feelings, and tells the story of a mother bird who flew through flames to get to her 
nestlings (6.497). Kendall cites Buffon  as the authority for his description of  birds 
that, their migration delayed by having to rebuild lost nests, die of cold (39), adding 
further emphasis on avian feeling: his martins fail to leave because they are pining for 
their lost young, and his swallows because they will not leave their weak brood (39, 
45—6). The Swallow’s account of the “desolated” martin parents whose nestlings are 
stolen by the foolish boy Edmund Eager is preceded by an epigraph from Thomson’s 
Seasons describing the mourning of a mother nightingale who finds her nest empty 
(22).
32
 These lines were regularly quoted in support of kindness to animals; at the 
same time, they are evidence of the strong interest in natural history for which 
Thomson was praised.
33
 Poetic feeling for birds’ affections was understood to co-exist 
with scientific investigation of their characteristics. 
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However, the co-existence was sometimes an uneasy one, and Kendall’s 
narrative creation of dog and birds as feeling individuals is sometimes at odds with his 
presentation of them as objects of scientific and philosophical knowledge. While his 
bird stories evoke sympathy for avian grief at the loss of young, he also remarks that a 
bird’s death is (as a bereaved mother bird in The Sparrow says, with more than the 
usual narrative implausibility): “no evil: since it could only take away from us that of 
which we could never feel the loss” (73—4). This discrepancy is not so much the 
clash between a warmly engaged narrative sympathy and a coolly detached natural 
history as it is expressive of a tension within natural history itself. Natural historians, 
as Lorraine Daston has documented, were capable of developing strong attachments 
even to the individual insects that absorbed their prolonged close attention;
34
 they also 
shot creatures in their thousands to build up a repository of knowledge. The subject of 
birds’ parental feelings was one which roused their sympathies, and there were many 
accounts of the wonderful instinct of affection implanted in them to enable them to 
bring up their young. These probably influenced William Smellie, when asking to be 
sent avian specimens for a projected museum, to request that shooting take place out 
of the nesting season to reduce cruelty; but then his collector’s instincts overpowered 
him, and he indicated his desire for eggs and nests containing young as well.
35
 
Such contradictory attitudes in natural historians can perhaps be seen as  
symptomatic of a struggle between the anthropocentric assumptions that, like their 
contemporaries, they lived by, and the anti-anthropocentrism that was available at 
least as a theoretical attitude within the natural theology by which they were strongly 
influenced. Keith Thomas has described the gradual “dethronement of man” from his 
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self-appointed position at the centre of the world as one of the most significant 
philosophical innovations in modern Western thought.
36
  Kendall provides amusing 
fables to underline the principle that, as the ornithologist John Ray had pointed out a 
century previously, the beasts were not created solely for man’s benefit.37 The Canary 
Bird contains a swallow who, seeing its own species as the centre of the universe, 
deplores the cruelty of hawks. Kendall catches the idiom of the fictional convention of 
the lady of false sensibility when his swallow avers that it could never eat a bird itself:  
“independently of the cruelty of the deed, I should nauseate the dish” (20). 
Immediately afterwards the swallow decides to eat a “terrified” beetle, unmoved by 
the beauty of its “brilliant verdigris” wings, despite having cited the beauty of 
swallows as a reason not to kill them (21). The dialogue in which the swallow claims 
that beetles are created for its use, while the beetle declares the same of the smaller 
insects it eats, offers an anthropomorphic satire on anthropocentrism, and a dig at the 
notion of a hierarchical scale of nature. “I grant you are a living thing,” sneers the 
bird, “but, infinitely low in the scale of beings when compared with swallows” (44). 
Here, the satire on human pride works in the traditional fabular manner, animal 
actions standing metaphorically for human ones; but Kendall claims a double purpose 
in the fable’s conclusion that no creature can be blamed for predatory behaviour. The 
swallow realises that “it is wrong to load any creature with reproach for doing what 
nature has directed. … in an enlarged point of view, a hawk is as innocent as a 
swallow” (47). The narrator explains that he intends to teach “a natural, as well as a 
moral, truth. …  to prove that all are innocent, I prove that all are guilty” (48—9). 
Even the human self-centredness the narrative mocks is thus part of the natural order, 
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a point further explicated in The Swallow by Mr Aylesford: “every species of 
creatures … evinces an obvious preference to its own kind … A philosophic mind 
will, in part, rise above this sensation, to which mankind, in common with brutes, is 
subject” (118—9). 
As Kendall’s swallow and beetle fable indicates, he is interested not only in 
the natural historians’ discussion of species’ identity and characteristics, but in a 
wider economy of nature. This is especially seen in his use of the work of Bernadin de 
Saint Pierre. When The Sparrow’s protagonist complains that birds are persecuted  
“like the poor outcast of India” (54), it is not just as two objects of pity that are united 
(a typical way of linking animals with the poor in contemporary children’s fiction) but 
two possessors of natural wisdom. The “poor outcast” refers to the pariah in Bernadin 
de St Pierre’s La Chaumière indienne, which Kendall had translated.38 In this story of 
an English scientist travelling in search of enlightenment, the high-caste Brahmin is of 
no help but the “Indian Paria” is truly wise. “[R]ejected by society” he has “sought 
refuge in Nature”, and made the transition recommended by natural theologians from 
loving nature to adoring its author (29, 28). The eponymous hero of The Crested Wren 
professes a similar creed. Surveying from his mountain top a panorama of hills and 
castles appearing like islands in the mist, he asks: “Than this prospect, what could 
present us with a more sublime idea of the power of the Deity [?]” (34). These are 
common ideas of the time, and Kendall draws on a wide range of writers in his praise 
of what Thomson, in “Autumn”, called “NATURE! all-sufficient! over all!” (The 
Seasons, 200), but Bernadin is a particularly important source, especially of what 
might be called the proto-ecological thinking in Kendall’s work. In Bernadin’s first 
Etude, translated by Kendall, he explains that he cannot write a conventional natural 
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history describing animals and plants by species because it is impossible to track the 
myriad, intricate interconnections between all living creatures which create the 
subject’s real significance.39 Kendal brings some of this appreciation into his 
children’s stories. All parts of creation, he writes in The Canary Bird, are 
interdependent and necessary, and “the extinction of a single species of birds, would 
derange the economy of the world” (71). In The Sparrow he draws on Bernadin’s 
Sixth Etude to argue that humans should beware of exterminating so-called pests. 
When the Prussian peasants killed all the sparrows for eating grain, the harvests were 
ruined by insects whose numbers had previously been controlled by birds(41—2).40 
Kendall’s children’s stories, then, are infused with knowledge and ideas from 
various kinds of natural history. His combination of a natural historian’s observation 
of animal life with narrative strategies designed to arouse sympathy produces, at 
times, a powerful imaginative rendition of animal sensation. The protagonist of The 
Crested Wren manages to describe and analyse its feelings when piled along with 
other birds in a bird-catcher’s basket: 
 
One of my wings was under the whole weight of another; one of my feet was 
forced into the beak of a bird, who bit it in expiring, which I was not able to 
withdraw; and the nails of another bird pierced my breast. The sensations of 
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misery that I suffered were acute; but benevolent nature would not suffer them 
to be durable. There is a point at which every thing must stop; and pain and 
ruin have an end. In a little time my pulses seemed to cease; and by degrees a 
soft delirium took possession of what remained of life. In this state, the mind 
does not altogether invent new, but rather distorts, newly colours, and changes 
the places of real circumstances. The warm and downy feathers of the dead 
and dying were, in my weak imagination, the nest in which I was born; the 
cries of the sufferers lost the bitterness of their anguish, and were only the 
little plainings of my brothers and sisters, for the return of our father and our 
mother. My nerves grew paralized, and were no longer tortured by the 
pressure of sharp claws, which I now fancied to be only the little feet of my 
brother. I heard their noises again: I looked out from the nest: I saw the forest, 
the lake, the swans upon its surface, the bright rising sun: I, too, was hungry: I 
uttered a little cry; but nature soon ceased to want: I believed that our parents 
returned, and I was satisfied (55—7).  
 
First-person narrative here combines philosophic observation with the “animals’-eye 
view” that Tess Cosslett has described in late eighteenth-century children’s fiction.41 
The Crested Wren bears an epitaph from James Beattie’s “Retirement”, which asks 
“Solitude” to protect an old pilgrim: “O guard from harm his hoary head / And listen 
to his lore”.42 Kendall’s altered version pleads instead for the reader to protect the 
goldcrest:  “O! guard from harm his golden head, /And listen to his lore!” 43 This 
nicely encapsulates Kendall’s technique of turning human into animal “lore”. The 
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story’s opening puts Buffon’s words into the bird’s mouth, closely following the 
natural historian’s text but switching viewpoint. Buffon’s favourable description of 
the netting of goldcrests: “In autumn they are fat, and their flesh is delicate: during 
that season they are commonly caught by means of the call. The public markets of 
Nuremberg are then well stocked with these little birds” (Natural History of Birds, 5: 
370), becomes the crested wren’s complaint that: “treachery frequently entraps us. 
Artificial calls invite us to the snare, and every autumn the shambles of Nuremberg 
are filled with gold-crested Wrens. Into this danger I was once betrayed” (The Crested 
Wren, 11). As well as Buffon’s natural history, Kendall also uses some more fanciful 
accounts of bird behaviour, drawing on Johann Georg Keyssler for an account of a 
wild stork that believed a tame one responsible for the shooting of one of its fellows, 
and brought a group of its friends back on successive occasions over two years to 
attack and finally kill the tame bird. 
44
 The story was frequently cited in the period as 
an example of the brute creation’s powers of understanding;45 Kendall expands on this 
interpretation, using the anecdote as evidence that birds communicate among 
themselves, plan together, feel for each other, and have powerful memories (49).That 
this list of avian abilities is reeled off by a goldcrest responding to a sparrow’s story 
shows the author enjoying the paradoxes inherent in his combination of talking-
animal fable and natural history. 
 
However, it is in the third-person narrative of Keeper’s Travels that Kendall 
best develops his distinctive contribution to children’s fiction, the creation of a 
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sympathetic imagining of animal consciousness. Thought report is extensively used to 
create an impression of the dog’s mind and encourage reader empathy with his 
feelings. Particularly valued for its ability to render unspoken thoughts and 
unconscious and semi-conscious states of mind in humans,
46
 thought report is 
especially useful for fictional animals because it obviates the need to attribute human 
language to the animal character. The narrative simultaneously invites the reader to 
feel along with Keeper and to understand his mind in a way he cannot himself. 
Aspects of mind controversial in their attribution to animals, such as hope, fear and 
intention, are easily, perhaps inevitably, given to a dog through whom a narrative is 
partly focalised. At the same time, the limitations of the dog’s knowledge are dwelt 
on, adding to the impression that we are being given a window on the experience of a 
creature very different from ourselves:  
 
He ran hastily along, without stopping to notice any thing, resolved to seek the 
house of a friend of his master, on whom they had called during their journey. 
This was considerably out of the direct homeward way, but here he hoped to 
find his master; and if he should not, still it was to him the only road: because 
the utmost of his knowledge, correct and surprising as it was, could only help 
to trace back the very steps he had trodden before (13).  
 
When Keeper is wounded by a gunshot the reader is invited not just to imagine his 
sufferings, but to do so with a canine body and mental perspective in view: 
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His sufferings increased his weariness, and overcome by their acuteness, he 
lay down under a hay-rick, and folded up his legs, curling his body round to 
protect himself from the blast. He would have slept, but the anguish he 
endured, denied him even a short respite from his sorrows. He lay pondering 
his condition: and if he anticipated no evils to come, the same ignorance of 
future events, which men sometimes inconsiderately envy, shut from him the 
hope of deliverance … (39—40)  
We are invited into Keeper’s mind when he is in danger of dying in the snow. In line 
with his species’ reputation for fidelity, Keeper in delirium thinks only of his master:  
 
his wildered fancy cheered his expiring moments with the form, and features 
of his master. He fancied that this friend of his life was endeavouring to rescue 
him from his misery. He thought that his warm hand was on his neck. He 
thought that he dug away the perishing snow. The idea became still less 
distinct: he even thought himself relieved from his misery. He fancied himself 
in the arms of his master. He was happy. He was insensible (135—6).  
 
In all this Kendall’s story can be seen as a forerunner of the empathetic accounts of 
animal life in fiction by Ernest Thompson Seton in Wild Animals I Have Known 
(1898) and Lives of the Hunted (1901), 
47
 and Jack London in The Call of the Wild 
(1903) and White Fang (1906).
48
 His choice of a dog as the subject of his most 
sustained attempt to render animal experience anticipates London’s interest in the 
consciousness of dogs and wolves. White Fang has been described as an example of 
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the most thorough kind of narrative attempt to “reproduce something like the texture 
or content or shape of nonhuman thought … [in which] the narrating limits itself 
rigorously within the animal’s natural and/or conventional sphere of interest and 
reference”.49 Keeper’s Travels is an early, less fully developed, experiment in a 
similar kind of narration. In the attention it pays to its dog protagonist’s body 
positions, it can even be seen as an early movement in the direction of the 
phenomenological approach to understanding animal experience recently developed 
by ethnologists such as Kenneth J Shapiro.
50
 Kendall does not go so far as these later 
animal writers in trying to understand the world from a canine perspective – for 
example, Keeper’s inner world is dependent on visual imagery, and there is no 
attempt in the 1798 text to render his sensations of smell – but his work does mark a 
new start in the fictional examination of animal mind. 
Kendall  later extended that examination in ways that illustrate the influence of 
developing conventions of nineteenth-century fictional realism on animal 
representation. For the fourteenth edition of Keeper’s Travels, published in 1826, the 
author provided considerable revisions and additions, taking the original 190-page 
story to 374 pages.  There are extended interpolated episodes involving human 
characters, and a long discussion of the treatment of animals. Some of the additions 
provide rather tortuous explanations for narrative events, as if Kendall is responding 
to charges that his dog ought, realistically, to have been able to find its way home. In 
many ways this additional material spoils the simplicity and immediacy of the earlier 
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version, but there are also some advances in Kendall’s representation of animal 
experience.  Natural history is more methodically applied, and Kendall characterises 
Keeper by his sense of smell. In the first edition, his master is lost by going “out of 
sight” (1), and the dog is “prevented by the multitude of people from seeing any 
person at a distance” (2). In 1826, he relies on his nose. When his master disappears, 
Keeper : 
 
instantly endeavoured to discover him again by the scent, yet he failed; partly, 
perhaps, because among so many different persons, the scent was first 
confused, and next entirely lost; and partly, also, perhaps, because Keeper 
being but a puppy, or, at most, but a very young dog, either his sense of smell 
was not so nice, or his habits of distinguishing, either by the nose or the eye, 
so experienced, and therefore so exact, as might have happened, had he, at the 
time of his misfortune, been arrived at a maturer age.
51
  
 
Closer observation of canine behaviour is combined here with a hint of the 
Bildungsroman in the notion of young dog as maturing character. Equally, references 
to cross-species communication through body-language and sympathy, present in the 
first edition, are developed in 1826 with more circumstantial detail. Wounded, Keeper 
takes refuge in a cottage, with whose mistress he soon establishes a rapport: 
 
Trembling, not with present fear, but from his past ill-usage, and without 
moving from the couch which he had chosen, Keeper lifted his face to Nelly’s, 
and his apology was instantly made, and mutual confidence inspired. Nelly 
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was not afraid of a dog whose countenance told his benevolence, his humility, 
and his misery; and Keeper had no sooner caught the eyes of Nelly, than he 
felt that his appeal was allowed. Stooping down, and re-assuring him, by the 
tone of her voice, Nelly soon permitted herself to pat his head, and to 
endeavour to examine his wounds: but from this latter office the pain made 
him shrink, in a manner that forbade its continuance, while he licked, 
however, the hand that was thus beneficently extended to him (1826, 78—9).  
 
This quiet reciprocal exchange presents the dog as a character integrated within a 
piece of early nineteenth-century sentimental  domestic fiction. 
By the 1820s thought report and free indirect discourse in fiction were much 
more extensively used, and the influence of recent narrative developments are clearly 
seen in the 1826 edition’s much more expansive rendering of the dog’s thoughts when 
he loses his master: 
 
Room was there for hope, and hope, therefore, was not long in returning. Had 
he finally lost his master through this very mistake of his person? Had he left 
him behind, when he idly thought that he saw him travelling before? Here 
were new subjects of alarm, but new occasions, also, for hope. In proportion 
as these thoughts shot across Keeper’s mind, his howl of despair was 
exchanged for a bark of eagerness. His limbs equally with his voice, moved 
with his thoughts. … At first, confident in the new prospect of discovery 
which he had created, he ran with all his might; anon, inward misgivings 
slackened his pace. Then, hopes a second time revived, meditations on 
possibilities, thoughts of places yet unvisited, or believed to have been 
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unvisited, or not examined with sufficient care; these brought his feet into a 
somewhat even, though generally hurried step, and it was amid this variety of 
feeling that Keeper regained the market-place (1826, 10—11). 
 
Here, the rapid fluctuation of thought and feeling, the indirect rendition of the 
character’s internal monologue, and the alignment of mental experience with bodily 
expression, are all features of the detailed narrative examination of human minds 
characteristic of early nineteenth-century fiction, and perfected especially in Austen. 
Indeed, Kendall’s representations of Keeper’s mind sometimes read like simpler 
versions of the multi-layered renditions of human thought and feeling in, for example, 
Emma. Keeper’s ready access to renewed hope is not unlike Mr Weston’s “sanguine 
temper”, which “soon flies over the present failure, and begins to hope again”,52 while 
the dog protagonist shares with Emma herself the tendency to ask himself indirectly 
reported internal questions.
53
 A succession of thoughts is said to have “shot across 
Keeper’s mind”, in rather the same way as the conviction that Mr Knightley must 
marry her “darted through” Emma (320). Keeper’s inward fluctuations are expressed 
in changes of bodily movement: misgivings slacken his pace, revived hopes speed it 
up. A similar alignment of mental and physical activity occurs in Emma when she is 
agitated by the thought that she may have inadvertently promoted a marriage between 
Mr Knightley and Harriet: “How to understand it all! How to understand the 
deceptions she had been thus practising on herself, and living under! – The blunders, 
the blindness of her own head and heart! – she sat still, she walked about, she tried her 
own room, she tried the shrubbery” (323—4); and “what could be increasing Emma’s 
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wretchedness but the reflection never far distant from her mind, that it had been all 
her own work? … she was not able to refrain from a start, or a heavy sigh, or even 
from walking about the room for a few seconds” (332). 
 These comparisons are not offered in order to suggest the direct influence of 
Austen on Kendall, still less that his rendering of mental life approaches anywhere 
near the subtlety of her mediation between sympathetic engagement and detached 
comment. Rather, they indicate something of the direction in which fictional 
rendering of minds had moved by the time Kendall revised his work, and illustrate 
some of the techniques on which novelists after Austen were drawing. Kendall’s 
achievement is to apply such techniques to the representation of a dog’s mind, while 
carefully attending to its canine character.  Keeper’s questions to himself about how 
he lost his master may strike a modern reader as pure anthropomorphism, but if we 
take them as thought report’s verbal representation of non-verbal mental activity, they 
are quite in line with Hume’s view in the Treatise that dogs can reason simply and 
learn from experience (1.3.16, 177-8). Keeper’s canine nature is equally evident in the 
howls and barks that shooting thoughts produce in him, as opposed to the reflections 
and speeches produced in Emma. (At the same time, the two authors’ shared emphasis 
on the bodily movements sparked off by mental shifts can serve to remind us that 
Austen herself recognises an “animal” correspondence of mind and body in her 
human characters). 
 Kendall, then, drew on Humean analogies between human and non-human 
mental life, breaking down the barriers between them to establish a dog’s potential to 
be a fictional character under realistic conventions while remaining a dog. In his 
hands, children’s fiction was at the forefront of developing fictional technique at a 
time when novelists were deepening their approach to representing the mind. The 
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latest discoveries of natural historians played an important part in his narrative 
innovations. While the debate about animal mind continued, for readers of children’s 
fiction it was settled in favour of the animals. Stories centring on animal experience 
and approaching animals as characters with all the new fictional resources developed 
for the creation of fictional mind in humans necessarily gave the impression that mind 
was an animal attribute too. In Kendall’s work, this view was not conveyed with the 
obvious anthropomorphism of those later animal stories whose protagonists dress and 
live like humans, but with a combination of a natural historian’s interest in the 
cognition and behaviour of different species, and a novelist’s interest in rendering 
those characteristics with narrative sympathy. 
 
